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ABOVE POLITICS: CONGRESS AND THE
SUPREME COURT IN
JASON MAZZONE*
The composition of the Supreme Court is often an issue that receives 
attention in presidential elections. In the 2016 election, the Court figured 
very prominently because Justice Antonin Scalia’s death in February of 
2016 produced a vacancy on the Court. Soon after Scalia died, Republican 
Senators, led by Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell, announced that 
they would not hold confirmation hearings on or vote on any nominee to 
the Court made by President Barack Obama.1 Rather, Senate Republicans 
stated, the choice of the next member of the Court should be made by Pres-
ident Obama’s successor so that the voters, in electing the new President in 
November, would have an opportunity to weigh in on the kind of Justice 
they wanted to replace Scalia.2 Even after Obama nominated Merrick Gar-
land to the Court in March of 2016, Republican Senators held fast to their 
plan, with most refusing even to meet with the nominee.3 Republicans ar-
gued they were simply adhering to a longstanding practice of not consider-
ing Supreme Court nominations during a presidential election year,4 though 
* Albert E. Jenner, Jr. Professor of Law, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.
1.  See Matt Viser & Annier Linskey, GOP Leaders Say Obama Must Not Fill Supreme Court
Seat, BOS. GLOBE (Feb. 14, 2016), https://www.bostonglobe.com/news/politics/2016/02/13/partisan-
dispute-breaks-out-immediately-over-antonin-scalia-replacement-process-for-supreme-
court/CSPFenWpAZIK8kExPQiY8H/story.html [https://perma.cc/ZS5J-E4Y3].
2.  Burgess Everett & Glenn Thrush, McConnell Throws Down Gauntlet: No Scalia Replacement
Under Obama, POLITICO (Feb. 13, 2016), http://www.politico.com/story/2016/02/mitch-mcconnell-
antonin- scalia-supreme-court-nomination-219248 [https://perma.cc/3NMT-QA5B] (“‘The American 
people should have a voice in the selection of their next Supreme Court Justice. Therefore, this vacancy 
should not be filled until we have a new president,’ McConnell said . . . .”).
3.  Press Release, Senator Mitch McConnell, McConnell on Supreme Court Nomination (Mar.
16, 2016), https://www.mcconnell.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2016/3/mcconnell-on-supreme-court-
nomination [https://perma.cc/U4VZ-M7S3] (“The American people may well elect a President who 
decides to nominate Judge Garland for Senate consideration. The next President may also nominate 
someone very different. Either way, our view is this: Give the people a voice in the filling of this vacan-
cy.”).
4.  See, e.g., Letter from Republican Members of Senate Comm. on the Judiciary to Mitch
McConnell, Senate Majority Leader (Feb. 23, 2016), 
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/02/23/us/politics/document-Senate-SCOTUS-
Letter.html?hp&action=click&pgtype=Homepage&clickSource=story-heading&module=first-column-
region&region=top-news&WT.nav=top-news [https://perma.cc/4YUT-EBCQ] (“Not since 1932 has the 
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that claim did not comport with the historical record.5 With a standoff be-
tween the Republican-controlled Senate and the Obama White House, the 
unfilled vacancy on the Court was repeatedly a theme of the 2016 presiden-
tial race. For instance, in their party acceptance speeches, Donald J. Trump 
and Hillary Rodham Clinton both referred to the Supreme Court as a key 
campaign issue.6 Filling the Scalia vacancy was also a topic of the presi-
dential candidate debates.7 During the course of the election, Trump re-
leased two lists of names from which he promised, if elected, to select the 
next Justice.8 Both Trump and Clinton referred to the Supreme Court in 
campaigning and ran advertisements portraying the future composition of 
the Court as a key election concern.9
In the congressional elections of 2016 the Supreme Court was also an 
important topic. By refusing Obama the opportunity to name a new Justice, 
Republicans risked voter backlash and, given the already tight Senate races 
in several states, a loss of their majority control of the Senate after 2016.10
Senate confirmed in a presidential election year a Supreme Court nominee to a vacancy arising in that 
year.”).
5.  See generally Robin Bradley Kar & Jason Mazzone, The Garland Affair: What History and
the Constitution Really Say About President Obama’s Powers to Appointment a Replacement for Jus-
tice Scalia, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. ONLINE 53 (2016).
6.  See Donald J. Trump, Acceptance Speech as Prepared for Delivery at the Republican Nat’l 
Convention (July 21, 2016), https://www.politico.com/story/2016/07/full-transcript-donald-trump-
nomination-acceptance-speech-at-rnc-225974 [https://perma.cc/JF9S-JRJQ] (“We are . . . going to 
appoint justices to the United States Supreme Court who will uphold our laws and our Constitution. The 
replacement for Justice Scalia will be a person of similar views and principles. This will be one of the 
most important issues decided by this election.”); Hillary Rodham Clinton, Acceptance Speech as 
Prepared for Delivery at the Democratic Nat’l Convention (July 28, 2016), 
https://www.politico.com/story/2016/07/full-text-hillary-clintons-dnc-speech-226410 
[https://perma.cc/N4XS-FCQV] (“[W]e need to appoint Supreme Court justices who will get money out 
of politics and expand voting rights, not restrict them.”).
7.  In particular, it was the opening topic at the third debate on Oct. 19, 2016. See Donald J.
Trump & Hillary Rodham Clinton, Full Transcript of the Third 2016 Presidential Debate (Oct. 20, 
2016), https://www.politico.com/story/2016/10/full-transcript-third-2016-presidential-debate-230063 
[https://perma.cc/B3GX-N4RK]. 
8.  See Joseph P. Williams, Trump: Next Supreme Court Nominee Will Come from Conservative
List, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (May 1, 2017, 11:23 AM), 
https://www.usnews.com/news/politics/articles/2017-05-01/trump-next-supreme-court-nominee-will-
come-from-conservative-list [http://perma.cc/3N9W-5E9L]. 
9.  See, e.g., Gabrielle Levy, Clinton: 2016 is ‘Make or Break’ Moment for the Supreme Court,
U.S. NEWS (Mar. 28, 2016), https://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2016-03-28/clinton-2016-is-make-
or-break-moment-for-supreme-court [https://perma.cc/B5EN-PNQS]. 
10.  See, e.g., Bill Theobald, Supreme Court Vacancy Now Part of Nevada Senate Race, RENO 
GAZETTE J., (Feb. 16, 2016, 2:14 PM), http://www.rgj.com/story/news/2016/02/16/supreme-court-
vacancy-now-part-nevada-senate-race/80464886/ [https://perma.cc/278Y-ZPHZ] (“If the Senate race in 
Nevada were not consequential enough already, add the future makeup of the Supreme Court to the list 
of issues at stake.”); Susan Davis, Scalia’s Death Will Cast a Long Shadow Across This Year’s Senate 
Races, NPR (Feb. 15, 2016, 6:04 AM), https://www.npr.org/2016/02/15/466735802/scalia-s-death-and-
the-2016-senate-races [https://perma.cc/K43Y-RZ9F] (“[T]he open question is whether Republicans’ 
refusal to consider a Supreme Court nominee will blow back on . . . incumbents McConnell is trying to 
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At the same time, with the future of the Court as a prominent election issue, 
there was the possibility of increased voter turnout and unpredictable ef-
fects also for Congressional House races—and even for elections for offic-
es at the state and local levels. Commentators called the Supreme Court the 
“most important issue in the 2016 election,”11 referred to election day as a 
“turning point” for the Court,12 predicted a “historic transformation”13 as
the next President “shape[d] the . . . Court for generations,”14 and deemed 
the election a “referendum on the Supreme Court.”15 A week after the elec-
tion, with Republicans having secured the White House and control of 
Congress, Republican Senator (and one-time presidential candidate) Ted 
Cruz announced that “in a very real respect, Justice Scalia was on the bal-
lot,” and that he had won.16
Given all of the attention on the Supreme Court during the 2016 elec-
tion, this Essay examines the place of the Court in national politics during 
2017. In particular, it focuses on activities pertaining to the Court in the 
first session of the 115th Congress (beginning on January 3, 2017 and end-
ing on January 2, 2018). The most obvious action during 2017 is, of course, 
the appointment of Neil Gorsuch to the Supreme Court to fill the vacancy 
left by Justice Scalia. Nominated by President Trump on January 31, 2017,
protect.”); Russell Berman, A Death That Reshapes U.S. Politics, ATLANTIC (Feb. 13, 2016), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/02/antonin-scalia-death-politics-senate-2016-
campaign-obama/462738/ [https://perma.cc/RQ54-MF57] (“With a large number of Republican sena-
tors in swing states up for reelection, a nomination battle could reshape the fall elections.”).
11.  Ari Berman, The Supreme Court is the Most Important Issue in the 2016 Election, NATION
(Feb. 16, 2016), https://www.thenation.com/article/the-supreme-court-is-the-most-important-issue-in-
the-2016-election/[https://perma.cc/LN8N-SFBF]; Paul Waldman, The Supreme Court Reminds Every-




12.  Noah Feldman, Election Day is a Turning Point for Supreme Court, BLOOMBERG VIEW (Nov. 
6, 2016), https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2016-11-06/election-day-is-a-turning-point-for-
supreme-court [https://perma.cc/K3UH-2G5K]. 
13.  Richard Wolf, Supreme Court Faces Historic Transformation After Election, USA TODAY
(Sept. 30, 2016, 6:06 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2016/09/30/supreme-court-
liberal-conservative-transformation-clinton-trump-garland/89957976/ [https://perma.cc/BLL9-PADE]. 
14.  Mashaun D. Simon, Analysis: Next President Could Shape Supreme Court for Generations,
NBC NEWS (Nov. 8, 2016, 12:16 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/2016-election-
day/analysis-next-president-could-shape-supreme-court-generations-n679326 [https://perma.cc/9SS5-
D79N]. 
15.  Dylan Matthews, Antonin Scalia’s Death Makes the 2016 Presidential Election a Referendum
on the Supreme Court, VOX (Feb. 13, 2016, 7:10 PM), 
https://www.vox.com/2016/2/13/10987210/antonin-scalia-death-2016-election 
[https://perma.cc/BC8W-GC3D]. 
16.  Ryan Lovelace, Cruz: Justice Scalia Won the Election, WASH. EXAMINER (Nov. 18, 2016, 
1:21 PM), http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/cruz-justice-scalia-won-the-election/article/2607775 
[https://perma.cc/X2D2-A6Q5]. 
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Gorsuch was confirmed on April 7, 2017 by the Senate following Republi-
cans’ repeal of the filibuster for Supreme Court nominations17 and amidst 
vigorous complaints by Democrats that a seat on the Court had been sto-
len.18 This Essay takes up other activities by members of Congress during 
2017 with respect to the Supreme Court. With their control of Congress, 
one might expect Republicans to have pursued legislation directed at or 
affecting the Supreme Court in ways that reflect their party’s priorities. 
Similarly, one might expect Democrats, after losing the 2016 electoral bat-
tles, to have focused some of their own congressional energies also on the 
third branch.
Part I examines efforts in Congress during 2017 to respond to disfa-
vored Supreme Court rulings on statutory grounds. Part II conducts a simi-
lar analysis with respect to rulings based upon the Constitution. Part III 
takes up other congressional efforts to regulate the operations of the Court 
and the work of the Justices. Part IV draws some lessons: it argues that 
notwithstanding all of the attention to the Supreme Court in the 2016 elec-
tions, 2017 was characterized by congressional modesty towards the Court 
and that, as a result, the Justices have very little to fear from the legislative 
branch. In other words, the Court is above politics not in the sense of being 
solely committed to the rule of law but because it operates beyond the 
reach of the political process.
I. RESPONSES TO STATUTORY RULINGS
When members of Congress believe the Supreme Court has interpret-
ed a statute incorrectly or in a manner that produces undesirable results, 
Congress can enact legislation in response. Commentators describe such 
legislation as “overriding” the Court’s ruling. Overrides take two basic 
forms. “Restorative” overrides correct a statutory interpretation that mem-
bers of Congress view as incorrect in light of the statute’s original lan-
guage, design, and purposes.19 “Policy” overrides involve the current 
17.  See Matt Flegenheimer, Senate Republicans Deploy ‘Nuclear Option’ to Clear Path for
Gorsuch, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 6, 2017). https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/06/us/politics/neil-gorsuch-
supreme-court-senate.html [https://perma.cc/52G6-DXXE].
18.  See, e.g., Press Release, Senator Jeff Merkley, Statement on Supreme Court (Jan. 31, 2017),
https://www.merkley.senate.gov/news/press-releases/merkley-statement-on-supreme-court 
[https://perma.cc/SB5E-E33B] (“This is a stolen seat being filled by an illegitimate and extreme nomi-
nee.”).
19.  Matthew R. Christiansen & William N. Eskridge Jr., Congressional Overrides of Supreme
Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 1967–2011, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1317, 1319 (2014) (“[With the 
view that] the Supreme Court has reneged on historic legislative commitments, Congress ‘restores’ 
what it considers the correct understanding of the statutory scheme, often the understanding that an 
agency had implemented before being rejected by the Court.”).
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Congress updating a statute that, in light of the Court’s interpretation, does 
not reflect current political preferences.20
Congress’s ability to override statutory rulings is routinely taken for 
granted. Responding to questions about the Supreme Court’s rulings on 
voting statutes, Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. stated at his confirmation 
hearing in 2005: “The final say on a statute is with Congress, and if they 
don’t like the Supreme Court’s interpretation of it, they can change it.”21 In
practice, however, things are more complicated. Recent studies demon-
strate that Congress’s ability to override or otherwise respond to a statutory 
ruling of the Court has varied over time and by circumstance and that over-
rides have become much less common than they once were. It is useful to 
briefly summarize the main findings in this area before turning to the use of 
overrides in the 115th Congress.
A. Empirical Studies of Statutory Overrides
In a 1991 empirical study of congressional responses to Supreme 
Court statutory rulings, Professor William Eskridge reported that “Con-
gress and its committees are aware of the Court’s statutory decisions, de-
vote significant efforts toward analyzing their policy implications, and 
override those decisions with a frequency heretofore unreported.”22 Identi-
fying an uptick in overrides from prior years, Eskridge found that the eight 
Congresses from 1975–1990 overrode an average of twelve Supreme Court 
decisions per Congress.23 Eskridge’s analysis supported a model of statuto-
ry interpretation in which there is an ongoing dialogue between Congress 
and the Court: Congress legislates, the Court interprets the legislation, and 
if a later Congress is dissatisfied, it legislates anew. Eskridge’s study also 
identified factors that contribute to the likelihood of Congress overriding a 
Supreme Court statutory ruling: “Congressional overrides are most likely 
20.  Id. at 1320 (discussing “more routine policy-updating . . . rather than ‘correction” of judicial
mistakes”).
21.  Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to Be Chief Justice of the
United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 231 (2005).
22.  See William N. Eskridge Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions,
101 YALE L.J. 331, 334 (1991). Eskridge treated as overriding a Supreme Court decision any statute 
that:
(1) completely overrules the holding of a statutory interpretation decision, just as a subsequent
Court would overrule an unsatisfactory precedent, or (2) modifies the result of a decision in
some material way, such that the same case would have been decided differently, or (3) modi-
fies the consequences of the decision, such that the same case would have been decided in the
same way but subsequent cases would be decided differently.
Id. at 332 n.1.
23.  See id. at 338.
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when a Supreme Court interpretation reveals an ideologically fragmented 
Court, relies on the text’s plain meaning and ignores legislative signals, 
and/or rejects positions taken by federal, state, or local governments.”24
In a 2013 article, Professor Richard Hasen updated Eskridge’s study 
and found that over the prior two decades the number of Congressional 
overrides had “plummeted dramatically.”25 Hasen reported that from 1991–
2000, the average overrides per Congress had dropped to 5.8 Supreme 
Court cases, and then dropped further during 2001–2012 to an average 
override per Congress of just 2.8 cases.26 Hasen contended that these de-
clines were a product of increased political polarization that made it more 
difficult for Congress to act in response to rulings by the Court.27 Hasen 
further reported that, whereas in the past override legislation was often a 
bipartisan effort, overrides now involved party-line voting.28 Hasen con-
cluded that with the exception of “technical overrides,” those that are hid-
den in larger bills that generate support on other grounds, “[a]s moderates 
continue to leave Congress, and as members of both Houses become more 
polarized, the chances of bipartisan overrides diminish.”29 As for partisan 
overrides themselves, Hasen cautioned that they depend on a specific set of 
circumstances:
Partisan overrides of Supreme Court statutory decisions remain pos-
sible, but only when the conditions are right. . . .  
[They] require[ ] an unusual set of events: a [P]resident, House, and 
Senate majority of the same party; a [P]resident with ample political cap-
ital; and enough cross-over votes to beat a filibuster (something which 
looks unlikely to occur frequently as the remaining Senate moderates re-
tire or are beaten in elections).30
Hasen further warned that the decline of overrides—and their now partisan 
nature—has an important implication for separation of powers among the 
branches of government. With Congress unable to override judicial deci-
sions, the power of the Court increases, such that it has the final word on 
statutory questions in the same way it has the last word on the meaning of 
the Constitution.31 Hasen thus posited the end of the dialogic model of 
24.  Id. at 334.
25.  Richard L. Hasen, End of the Dialogue?: Political Polarization, the Supreme Court, and
Congress, 86 S. CAL. L. REV. 205, 209 (2013).
26.  Id.
27.  Id.
28.  See id. at 239–42.
29.  Id. at 241–42.
30.  Id. at 238–39.
31.  See id. at 224.
2018] CONGRESS AND THE SUPREME COURT 379
statutory interpretation in which it is presumed that if courts err, Congress 
can correct.32 In other words, Chief Justice Roberts’s assurance that Con-
gress can simply correct statutory rulings by the Court did not 
properly reflect the political realities that ma e those rulings largely 
immune to overrides.
Hasen’s diagnosis has generated some pushback but his finding that 
overrides have recently declined has been confirmed. In their responsive 
article, Eskridge and co-author Matthew Christiansen object to certain as-
pects of Hasen’s analysis and conclusions but agree that overrides have 
dropped.33 Christiansen and Eskridge report that while there has indeed 
been a decline in overrides during the period 2001–2011, the 1990s were 
actually a “golden age of overrides.”34 According to Christiansen and 
Eskridge: “As a matter of pure counting, the 102nd through 105th Con-
gresses (1991–1999) overrode eighty-six Supreme Court statutory deci-
sions, an average of more than twenty per Congress.”35 They note also that 
this era involved periods of divided government, in 1991–1993 and 1995–
1999.36 In contrast to Hasen’s analysis, these authors contend:
Congress in the 1990s was much more polarized than it was in the 1980s 
or 1970s, yet the 1990s was the golden age of overrides. Were polariza-
tion the entire story, we would expect overrides to decline as polarization 
increased, yet we see the opposite: during the 1990s overrides increased
during a time of increasing polarization.37
Nonetheless, Christiansen and Eskridge agree with Hasen that the rate 
of overrides has dropped: they find that from 1999–2011, “overrides fell 
off dramatically” (though they report that “every Congress between 1999 
and 2011 overrode at least three Supreme Court decisions” and thus over-
rides have “not been reduced to nothing”).38 They identify a total of thirty-
five Supreme Court decisions overridden during the period 1999-2011.39
They also provide a list of statistically-significant variables they identify as 
correlating with statutory overrides.40 In place of Hasen’s emphasis upon 
32.  See id. at 226–27.
33.  See generally Christiansen & Eskridge, Jr., supra note 19. 
34.  Id. at 1336–37.
35.  Id. at 1337.
36.  Id. at 1338–39.
37.  Id. at 1344.
38.  Id. at 1340.
39.  Id. at 1480–84 app. 1.
40.  Id. at 1321. The factors identified are as follows:
a close division (plurality or 5- or 6-Justice majority) among the Justices when deciding the
case;
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increased political polarization, Christiansen and Eskridge offer a different 
explanation for the decline:
We do not discount the importance of partisan polarization as a factor in 
the decline of overrides, especially during the Congresses that met dur-
ing and right after the impeachment of President Clinton. Nonetheless, 
our data suggest that polarization alone cannot explain the drop-off in 
overrides, given that overrides have flourished during the exceedingly 
polarized stretches of the 1990s. . . . More important, in our view, is the 
new legislative agenda in the twenty-first century. As a great deal more 
congressional attention is devoted to the war on terror, macroeconomic 
tax and spending policy, health care and insurance, and international 
trade and nuclear proliferation, relatively less congressional attention has 
been paid to the superstatutes41 that the Supreme Court has been inter-
preting, and Congress has been overriding, for the last forty to fifty 
years.42
Christiansen and Eskridge also view the recent drop in overrides as merely 
a short-term development rather than, as in Hasen’s view, indicative of a 
more enduring change in the allocation of power between Congress and the 
Court. According to Christiansen and Eskridge, while in the short term, 
“the combination of the new legislative agenda and the continuing partisan 
polarization will depress Congress’s inclination and capacity to enact over-
ride laws,” over the longer period, “countervailing pressures from interest 
groups, agencies, and the states ought to press Congress to update aging 
superstatutes, with the result being a resurgence of overrides.”43
Most of the differences between Hasen’s study and that of Eskridge 
and Christiansen result from different methodologies. In identifying over-
rides, Hasen relied upon congressional committee reports—the same ap-
proach Eskridge took in his own 1991 study. In their more recent study, 
Christiansen and Eskridge also used committee reports, but, with the view 
that “congressional committee reports provided much less on-point discus-
judicial rejection of the interpretation offered by a federal agency and usually defended by the
Solicitor General;
judicial narrowing of federal regulation, except in tax and intellectual property cases, where reg-
ulation-friendly interpretations are often overridden; 
reliance on plain meaning of statutory texts, especially when such reliance depends critically on
whole act and whole code arguments or flies in the face of strong legislative history; and 
invitations for Congress to override, issued by majority, concurring, or even dissenting Justices.
Id.
41.  “A superstatute is an ambitious law that supersedes common law baselines with a new public
norm or structure, such that that norm or structure has become entrenched in American public law.” Id.
at 1364.
42.  Id. at 1351.
43.  Id. at 1353.
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sion of judicial decisions after the 1980s,”44 they supplemented those re-
ports with Westlaw statutory and caselaw research.45 That approach yielded 
more overrides than did simple reliance upon committee reports (indeed, it 
required an updating of the number of overrides Eskridge had reported in 
his own 1991 study).46 In his further response, Hasen, writing with James 
Buatti, argues that while the Christiansen Eskridge study casts a wider 
net, the modified approach has drawbacks: 
Instead of a study of conscious overrides, the Christiansen–Eskridge 
study uses new methodology to study cases in which congressional ac-
tion consciously or unconsciously changed the understanding of a con-
gressional statute as the Supreme Court had interpreted it. In other 
words, the new study includes statutes in which there is no indication 
Congress knew that it was overriding a Supreme Court decision through 
a new statute. . . . While unconscious overrides can be important to study 
for many reasons, they are less relevant for purposes of studying the 
Congress–Supreme Court dialogue.47
In other words, in understanding the relationship between Congress and the 
Court, it may make more sense to focus—as Eskridge did in 1991—on
conscious activity rather than what occurs inadvertently. It is useful to 
know about statutes that happen to end up overriding a Supreme Court 
decision but they do not tell us a great deal about how Congress views the 
Court or what motivates congressional action. Nonetheless, Hasen con-
cludes that the Christiansen Eskridge study did identify an additional
twenty-five conscious overrides to add to the total number of forty-six
he had reported in his own earlier study.48
44.  Id. at 1336.
45.  Specifically:
We located on Westlaw every Supreme Court decision between 1964 and 2010 and inquired 
of Westlaw the subsequent citation history of the Supreme Court opinion. For a large number 
of cases, Westlaw identified the Court’s opinion as having been “superseded by statute,” “su-
perseded by statute/rule,” or “called into doubt by statute” and referred the reader to subse-
quent legal documents (usually lower court opinions) discussing the legislative response to 
the Supreme Court decision in question. We read all of those leads and the statutes they cited 
to determine whether the later mentioned statute was actually an override as we are using the 
term. About half the time, they were not overrides, but this was still an invaluable source of 
data because it provided concrete leads that we then investigated and evaluated.
Id. at 1328 (footnote omitted).
46.  Id. (“[N]ot only were a large majority of the overrides after 1990 discovered by this Westlaw
method, but we discovered many new overrides for the earlier period as well (1967–1990). Hence, the 
current study updates and adds to the 1991 Eskridge study.”).
47.  James Buatti & Richard L. Hasen, Response: Conscious Congressional Overriding of the
Supreme Court, Gridlock, and Partisan Politics, 93 TEX. L. REV. SEE ALSO 263, 264–65 (2015) (foot-
note omitted).
48.  Id. at 272–73.
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B. Overrides in 2017
Whether the analysis is limited to conscious overrides, as in the Hasen 
approach, or considers also unconscious overrides, as captured by the 
Christiansen–Eskridge approach, in 2017, Congress did not override any 
decision of the Supreme Court.49 In terms of Hasen’s analysis, the rate of 
overrides in 2017 is thus the same as that for Congress in 2013, 2012, and 
2010. Alternatively, considered in terms of the Christiansen–Eskridge 
analysis, so far, the 115th Congress has not met the minimum number of 
three overrides enacted by recent congresses.
Notably, the absence of 2017 overrides arose in a period in which Re-
publicans controlled both Houses of Congress and the White House. Con-
gress’s failure to enact any overrides during 2017 demonstrates that single-
party control of government is not by itself sufficient for overrides to occur. 
Significantly, Republicans had only slim margins in Congress; the relation-
ship between congressional Republicans and the President was rocky; and, 
reflective of national political divisions, Democrats mounted fierce 
opposition to the Republican legislative agenda. In an era in which 
Republicans failed to deliver on legislative campaign promises, most 
famously, to repeal the Affordable Care Act, it is perhaps little surprise 
that they  unable to muster majorities for overriding Supreme Court 
decisions.
C. Proposed Overrides
Congress’s failure to enact any statutory overrides of Supreme Court 
decisions does not mean that there was no interest in overrides in 
2017. Instead,  bills designed to override Supreme Court rulings
were introduced into the 115th Congress. These bills involved civil rights 
claims, arbitration, Indian land trusts, and patents. 
1. Civil Rights Claims
Override bills have targeted three Supreme Court cases involving civil 
rights. The Protecting Older Workers Against Discrimination Act seeks to 
overturn the Supreme Court’s decision in Gross v. FBL Financial Services
that mixed-motive claims are not available under the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act (ADEA).50 The bill has bipartisan support: the Senate 
49. To generate a list of the 2017 Acts of Congress, visit Congress.gov and select “115th Con-
gress,” “Legislation,” and “Became Law”; sort results by “Latest Action—Oldest to Newest;” and scroll 
down to the last 2017 entry.
50.  557 U.S. 167, 169, 180 (2009).
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version is sponsored by Republican Senators Chuck Grassley and Susan 
Collins and Democratic Senators Bob Casey and Patrick Leahy;51 the 
House version is sponsored by Democrats Bobby Scott and Mark Takano 
and Republicans Jim Sensenbrenner and David Young.52 Earlier versions 
of the bill were introduced beginning in 2009.53
In Gross, the Supreme Court held that, because Congress did not ex-
pressly amend the ADEA to address mixed motive claims, such claims 
were unavailable under the ADEA, and, instead, the complainant bears the 
burden of proving that a protected characteristic or protected activity was 
the “but for” cause of an unlawful employment practice.54 Writing for the 
majority, Justice Thomas distinguished the ADEA from Title VII, which 
Congress had amended “by explicitly authorizing discrimination claims in 
which an improper consideration was ‘a motivating factor’ for an adverse 
employment decision.”55 Justice Thomas observed that the ADEA did not 
specifically “provide that a plaintiff may establish discrimination by show-
ing that age was simply a motivating factor,” and that Congress did not 
“add such a provision to the ADEA” when it added the amending language 
to Title VII, “even though it contemporaneously amended the ADEA in 
several ways.”56 Thus, he concluded, the ADEA did not permit mixed-
motive claims.57
In dissent, Justice Stevens argued that the Court had disregarded Con-
gress’s command because “[t]he most natural reading of this statutory text 
prohibits adverse employment actions motivated in whole or in part by the 
age of the employee.”58 Stevens reasoned that in 1989, in Price Water-
house v. Hopkins, the Court rejected a but-for standard in construing identi-
cal language in Title VII, and that Congress also rejected the but-for 
approach when it later amended Title VII’s language.59 “Given this unam-
biguous history,” Stevens wrote, “it is particularly inappropriate for the 
Court, on its own initiative, to adopt an interpretation of the causation re-
quirement in the ADEA that differs from the established reading of Title 
VII.”60 Stevens accused the majority of “utter disregard of our precedent 
51.  S. 443, 115th Cong. (2017).
52.  H.R. 2650, 115th Cong. (2017).
53.  See S. 1756, 111th Cong. (2009).
54.  See Gross, 557 U.S. at 174–75, 177–78.
55.  Id. at 174.
56.  Id.
57.  See id. at 180.
58.  Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
59.  Id. (citing Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U. S. 228, 240 (1989)).
60.  Id. at 180–81.
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and Congress’ intent” and of an “an unabashed display of judicial lawmak-
ing.”61
The Protecting Older Workers Against Discrimination Act directly re-
sponds to Gross. According to the bill’s stated purposes, it is designed “to 
clarify congressional intent that mixed motive claims shall be available, 
and that a complaining party need not prove that a protected characteristic 
or protected activity was the ‘but for’ cause of an unlawful employment 
practice, under the ADEA and similar civil rights provisions.”62 It thereby 
“reject[s] the Supreme Court’s reasoning in the Gross decision that Con-
gress’ failure to amend any statute other than [T]itle VII . . . suggests that 
Congress intended to disallow mixed motive claims under other statutes.”63
Among other things, the proposed bill would amend the ADEA language to 
provide specifically that, “[i]n establishing an unlawful practice under this 
Act . . . a complaining party . . . need only produce evidence sufficient for a 
reasonable trier of fact to find that an unlawful practice occurred under this 
Act . . . and . . . shall not be required to demonstrate that age . . . was the 
sole cause of a practice.”64
A second bill to overturn a civil rights decision is the Equity and In-
clusion Enforcement Act.65 This is a House bill that would overturn the 
Supreme Court’s 2001 holding in Alexander v. Sandoval that there is no 
private right of action to enforce disparate impact regulations promulgated 
under Title VI.66 In contrast to the Protecting Older Workers Against Dis-
crimination Act, the Equity and Inclusion Enforcement Act is a purely 
Democratic undertaking, sponsored by Representative Bobby Scott and 
fourteen Democratic co-sponsors.67
Sandoval was a 5–4 decision with a majority opinion by Justice Scal-
ia.68 Writing that “[w]e . . . begin (and find that we can end) our search for 
Congress’s intent with the text and structure of Title VI,” Justice Scalia 
held that while private individuals could sue to enforce the ban on inten-
tional discrimination in section 601 of Title VI, regulations barring dispar-
ate impact could only be adopted under section 602 and, because that 
61. Id. at 182.
62. H.R. 2650, 115th Cong. § 2(b)(1) (2017).
63. Id. § 2(b)(2).
64. Id. § 3(a)(2).
65. See H.R. 2486, 115th Cong. (2017).
66. Id.
67. Cosponsors: H.R.2486—115th Congress (2017–2018), CONGRESS.GOV,
https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-bill/2486/cosponsors [https://perma.cc/96M3-
XQ3W].
68. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 277 (2001).
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provision is directed solely at agencies, it does not allow for a private right 
of action to enforce any resulting regulations.69
In its findings, the Equity and Inclusion Enforcement Act states that
Sandoval “overturned four decades of statutory protections against discrim-
ination by stripping victims of discrimination of the right to bring actions 
under [T]itle VI.”70 The bill proposes a simple statutory fix by adding to 
Title VI a provision reading: “The violation of any regulation relating to 
disparate impact issued under section 602 shall give rise to a private civil 
cause of action for its enforcement to the same extent as does an intentional 
violation of the prohibition of section 601.”71
A third bill, sponsored by Democrats in the Senate and the House, is 
the Fair Employment Protection Act.72 It responds to the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Vance v. Ball State University.73 That case concerned the cir-
cumstances under which an employer could be held vicariously liable un-
der Title VII for harassment committed by workplace supervisors. The 
Court held that under Title VII an employee is a “supervisor” only if the 
employee is empowered by the employer to take “tangible employment 
actions against the victim.”74 That is, a supervisor is one with power to 
“effect a ‘significant change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, 
failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibili-
ties, or a decision causing a significant change in benefits.’”75 In other in-
stances, an employer is only liable for harassment of one employee by 
another if the employer was negligent in controlling working conditions.76
Writing in dissent in Vance, Justice Ginsburg complained that by adopting 
a limited definition of supervisor for purposes of vicarious liability, the 
majority “ignores the conditions under which members of the work force 
labor, and disserves the objective of Title VII to prevent discrimination 
from infecting the Nation’s workplaces.”77 She called upon Congress to 
act: “The ball is . . . in Congress’ court to correct the error into which this 
Court has fallen, and to restore the robust protections against workplace 
harassment the Court weakens today.”78
69. See id. at 288–89.
70. H.R. 2486, 115th Cong. § 2(2) (2017).
71. Id. § 3.
72. S. 2019, 115th Cong. (2017); H.R. 4152, 115th Cong. (2017).
73. 133 S. Ct. 2434 (2013).
74. Id. at 2439.
75. Id. at 2443 (quoting Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761 (1998)).
76. Id. 2447–48
77. Id. at 2455 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
78. Id. at 2466.
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The Fair Employment Protection Act responds to Justice Ginsburg’s 
call. It would specify that under Title VII, as well as under other federal 
employment discrimination statutes, an employer may be held vicariously 
liable for conduct by individuals “authorized by the employer . . . to under-
take or recommend tangible employment actions affecting the employee[ ] 
or . . . to direct the employee’s daily work activities.”79
2. Arbitration
The 1925 Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) makes written arbitration 
agreements enforceable “save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equi-
ty for the revocation of any contract.”80 Although some commentators con-
tend that the FAA originated as a procedural statute governing enforcement 
of arbitration clauses in federal court,81 since the early 1980s, the Supreme 
Court has treated the FAA as reflecting a “national policy favoring arbitra-
tion.”82 Accordingly, in a series of decisions, the Court has construed the 
FAA to enforce consumer and employment contractual provisions mandat-
ing arbitration of claims and to preempt state laws protecting a right to sue 
either individually or as part of a class action.83
The Arbitration Fairness Act of 2017 seeks to overturn these rulings 
by nullifying contractual provisions that impose an arbitration requirement 
in employment, consumer, antitrust, or civil rights disputes (while permit-
ting the parties, after a dispute arises, to agree to arbitration if they so 
choose).84 The Senate bill was originally sponsored by Democrat Al Frank-
en of Minnesota (now resigned) and has twenty-six co-sponsors (twenty-
79. S. 2019, 115th Cong. § 3 (2017).
80. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012).
81. See, e.g., Hiro N. Aragaki, The Federal Arbitration Act as Procedural Reform, 89 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1939 (2014).
82. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984).
83. See, e.g., Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228 (2013) (holding that class
action waivers in arbitration agreements are enforceable under the FAA); CompuCredit Corp. v. 
Greenwood, 565 U.S. 95, 104 (2012) (holding that “because the [Credit Repair Organizations Act] is 
silent on whether claims under the Act can proceed in an arbitrable forum,” the FAA governs and 
requires that such claims be enforced according to the arbitration agreement); AT&T Mobility LLC v. 
Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 352 (2011) (holding that the FAA preempts California prohibition on class-
arbitration waivers); Rent-A-Ctr., W., Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 72 (2010) (holding that where an 
agreement to arbitrate includes a provision that the arbitrator will determine the enforceability of the 
agreement, if a party challenges specifically the enforceability of that particular provision, the district 
court considers the challenge, but if a party challenges the enforceability of the agreement as a whole, 
the challenge is for the arbitrator to resolve); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 
(1991) (holding that arbitration agreements are enforceable with respect to statutory disputes).
84. S. 537, 115th Cong. (2017).
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five Democrats plus Bernie Sanders, Independent of Vermont);85 the House 
version is sponsored by Georgia Democrat Hank Johnson and it has sixty-
three Democratic co-sponsors.86
The bill’s findings state that the FAA “was intended to apply to dis-
putes between commercial entities of generally similar sophistication and 
bargaining power” but that “[a] series of decisions by the Supreme Court of 
the United States have interpreted the Act so that it now extends to con-
sumer disputes and employment disputes, contrary to the intent of Con-
gress.”87 Notably, the bill appeared at a time the Court had on its docket the 
question of whether an agreement requiring resolution of employment dis-
putes through individual arbitration, and waiver of class and collective 
proceedings, is enforceable under the FAA.88 Earlier efforts to enact broad 
legislation of this sort to limit compelled arbitration have failed,89 although 
Congress has in the past enacted some piece-meal arbitration reforms.90
In addition to the Arbitration Fairness Act, Democratic members of 
Congress have introduced legislation to permit Wells Fargo customers who 
were victims of the bank’s fraudulent account scheme to sue the bank in 
court rather than be required to arbitrate claims under the FAA.91
3. Indian Land Trusts
The Indian Reorganization Act92 (IRA) permits the Secretary of the 
Interior to take land into trust for “Indians,” thereby restricting the jurisdic-
tion and sovereignty of the state where the land in question is located.93
Section 479 of the statute defines “Indians” to include “all persons of Indi-
85. Cosponsors: S. 537—115th Congress (2017–2018), CONGRESS.GOV,
https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/senate-bill/537/cosponsors [https://perma.cc/N63L-
GQ55].
86. Cosponsors: H.R. 1374—115th Congress (2017–2018), CONGRESS.GOV,
https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-bill/1374/cosponsors [https://perma.cc/DGU5-
3K75].
87. Id. § 2.
88. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, No. 16-285 (U.S. Sept. 2, 2016),
2016 WL 4611259.
89. See, e.g., Arbitration Fairness Act of 2011, S. 987, 112th Congress (2011). 
90. See, e.g., Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-118, § 8116, 123
Stat 3409, 3454–55 (the “Franken Amendment”) (prohibiting the use of funds for any contract in excess 
of $1 million if the contractor requires its employees to arbitrate claims under Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 or tort claims “related to or arising out of sexual assault or harassment, including 
assault and battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, false imprisonment, or negligent hiring, 
supervision or retention”); 48 C.F.R. § 252.222-7006 (2010) (implementing regulation).
91. Justice for Victims of Fraud Act of 2017, H.R. 1414, 115th Cong. (2017); Justice for Victims
of Fraud Act of 2017, S. 552, 115th Cong. (2017).
92. 25 U.S.C. §§ 461–79 (2009).
93. Id. § 465.
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an descent who are members of any recognized Indian tribe now under 
Federal jurisdiction.”94
In its 2009 decision in Carcieri v. Salazar, the Supreme Court held 
that “the term ‘now under Federal jurisdiction’ in § 479 unambiguously 
refers to those tribes that were under the federal jurisdiction of the United 
States when the IRA was enacted in 1934.”95 According to the Court, 
“Congress left no gap in . . . § 479 for the agency to fill,” but rather, be-
cause Congress had “explicitly and comprehensively defined the term” 
“Indian,” it had limited the Secretary’s authority.96 In the case before the 
Court, this meant that the federal government could not take land into trust 
that was acquired by the Narragansett Tribe because that tribe did not re-
ceive federal recognition until 1983.97
Given its broad implications, Carcieri provoked a strong reaction.98
Secretary Ken Salazar called it a “devastating ruling which reverses 75 
years of precedent.”99 He emphasized that, “[t]aking land into trust is one 
of the most important functions that the Department of Interior undertakes 
on behalf of Indian tribes,” and that, “[t]hese lands allow tribal communi-
ties to practice their cultural traditions, to provide housing for tribal mem-
bers and engage in economic development.”100 Bills have been introduced 
into every Congress since Carcieri to overturn the decision, but Congress 
has not enacted any of them.101 The effort continues in the 115th Congress, 
with a bill in the House sponsored by Tom Cole (Republican of Oklahoma) 
with two Democratic co-sponsors.102 As with prior bills, this bill would 
amend the Indian Reorganization Act to make it applicable to all federally 
94. Id. § 479.
95. Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379, 395 (2009).
96. Id. at 391–92.
97. See id. at 384, 391.
98. See, e.g., Loretta Tuell, The Obama Administration and Indian Law—A Pledge to Build a
True Nation-to-Nation Relationship, FED. LAW., Apr. 2016, at 44, 46–47 (“By calling into question the 
scope of the authority of the Interior secretary, the Court’s ruling threatened the validity of tribal busi-
ness organizations, subsequent contracts and loans, tribal reservations and lands, jurisdictional issues, 
public safety, and provision of services on reservations across the country.”).
99. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Secretary Salazar Welcomes American Indian




101. See, e.g., S. 1703, 111th Cong. (2010); H.R. 1234, 112th Cong. (2011); S. 2188, 113th Cong.
(2014); H.R. 407, 114th Cong. (2015) (“To amend the Act of June 18, 1934, to reaffirm the authority of 
the Secretary of the Interior to take land into trust for Indian tribes.”).
102. H.R. 130, 115th Cong. (2017) (“To amend the Act of June 18, 1934, to reaffirm the authority
of the Secretary of the Interior to take land into trust for Indian tribes, and for other purposes.”).
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recognized Indian tribes, regardless of when the tribe became recognized; 
the amendment would apply retroactively.103
4. Patents
The STRONGER Patents Act, a Senate bill sponsored by Christopher 
Coons (Democrat of Delaware) with one Republican and two Democratic 
co-sponsors, aims to “strengthen the position of the United States as the 
world’s leading innovator.”104 Among other things, the bill contains provi-
sions to increase patent enforcement mechanisms, reform the processes of 
administrative challenges to patents, reduce abusive patent demand notic-
es,105 and prevent diversion of patent application fees from the Patent and 
Trademark Office (PTO) to other government programs.
In providing stronger protections for patent-holders, the bill would 
overturn key Supreme Court cases interpreting existing patent laws. In 
particular, the bill would overturn eBay v. MercExchange106 and restore the 
presumption for injunctive relief for patent violations; eliminate a require-
ment that a single entity practice all steps of a method before finding an 
entity liable for inducement or contributory infringement of a patent;107
replace the requirement, adopted in Global-Tech Appliances v. SEB S.A.,108
to show actual knowledge that induced acts constituted infringement with 
proof merely that the alleged infringer intended to perform the infringing 
acts; and require the PTO to use the same patent construction standard used 
in district courts, thereby overturning Cuozzo Speed Technologies v. Lee.109
The bill incorporates provisions of prior, unsuccessful, bills including the 
STRONG Patent Act of 2015.110
103. Id. § 1.
104. S. 1390, 115th Cong. (2017).
105. See id. § 204; see also Targeting Rogue and Opaque Letters Act of 2015, H.R. 2045, 114th
Cong. (2015).
106. 547 U.S. 388 (2006) (holding that generally-applicable four-factor test for grant of injunctive
relief applies to Patent Act disputes).
107. This provision would thus appear to alter Limelight Networks, Inc. v. Akamai Techs.,
Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2111 (2014) (holding that there cannot be induced infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 
271(b) (2012) without direct infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(a)) and Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Lime-
light Networks, Inc., 797 F.3d 1020 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (holding that direct infringement under § 271(a) 
occurs where all steps of a claimed method are performed by or attributable to a single entity).
108. 563 U.S. 754 (2011).
109. 136 S. Ct. 2131 (2016).
110. S. 632, 114th Cong. (2015).
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D. Whistleblowers and the Federal Circuit
While the focus of this Essay is on the Supreme Court, the Follow the 
Rules Act, which became law in June of 2017, bears mention.111 It re-
sponds to a ruling of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit that 
was in turn based upon a Supreme Court decision.
The Follow the Rules Act amends § 2302(b)(9)(D) of the Whistle-
blower Protection Act to clarify that government employees are protected 
from adverse personnel actions for “refusing to obey an order that would 
require the individual to violate a law, rule, or regulation.”112 Prior to the 
amendment, the statutory language referred to protecting government em-
ployees who refused to violate “a law;” the Follow the Rules Act added the 
words, “rule or regulation” to this original statutory provision. It therefore 
responded to the Federal Circuit’s decision in Rainey v. Merit Systems Pro-
tection Board that held that because (at the time) § 2302(b)(9)(D) only 
referred to “law,” it only protected federal employees when they refused to 
violate a federal statute.113
The circuit court case involved a federal contracting officer at the De-
partment of State, Timothy Rainey, who refused to follow his supervisor’s 
order to direct a contractor to rehire a terminated subcontractor. Rainey 
contended that following the order would require him to violate the Federal 
Acquisition Regulation. In response, Rainey’s supervisor relived him of his 
duties. When the case reached the Federal Circuit, it invoked the Supreme 
Court’s 2015 decision in Department of Homeland Security v. MacLean.114
That case involved a separate provision of the Whistleblower Protection 
Act, § 2302(b)(8)(A), which protects government employees who disclose 
“any violation of any law, rule, or regulation” or “gross mismanagement, a 
gross waste of funds, an abuse of authority, or a substantial and specific 
danger to public health or safety,” so long as such disclosures are “not spe-
cifically prohibited by law.”115 A federal air marshal, Robert MacLean had 
disclosed a plan by the TSA to end air travel by air marshals in order to 
save money. MacLean leaked the plan to MSNBC; TSA quickly abandoned 
the plan. When TSA officials later determined MacLean was the source of 
the leak they fired him. MacLean argued that because he had only violated 
111. Follow the Rules Act, Pub. L. No. 115-40, § 2, 131 Stat. 861 (2017) (to be codified at 5
U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(D)).
112. 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(D) (2016).
113. 824 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
114. 135 S. Ct. 913 (2015).
115. 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)(A)(i)–(ii).
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a TSA regulation prohibiting disclosures and not a statutory law, his disclo-
sure was protected. The Supreme Court agreed with MacLean. It explained:
[A] broad interpretation of the word “law” could defeat the purpose of
the whistleblower statute. If “law” included agency rules and regulations,
then an agency could insulate itself from the scope of Section
2302(b)(8)(A) merely by promulgating a regulation that “specifically
prohibited” whistleblowing. But Congress passed the whistleblower stat-
ute precisely because it did not trust agencies to regulate whistleblowers
within their ranks. Thus, it is unlikely that Congress meant to include
rules and regulations within the word “law.”116
Relying upon that language from MacLean, the Federal Circuit in Rainey
construed § 2302(b)(8)(A) to hold that the term “law” in § 2302(b)(9)(D) 
was also limited to federal statutes.117 Thus, Rainey could not invoke the 
protections of the Whistleblower Act on the ground that his supervisor had 
directed him to violate a regulation. The circuit court’s use of MacLean in
this way was curious: in MacLean the Supreme Court was interpreting a 
different statutory provision and did so in a way that favored the discharged 
employee. The circuit court’s approach weakened protections for whistle-
blowers.
Congress quickly responded to the Rainey decision by enacting the 
Follow the Rules Act. The bill had bipartisan support at the outset: in the 
Senate, it was sponsored by three Republicans and two Democrats; in the 
House, it was sponsored by six Republicans and six Democrats.118 Intro-
duced in January of 2017, the bill passed the House on a unanimous sus-
pension motion and the Senate by unanimous consent and within six 
months of introduction the President had signed the bill into law. The 
Committee Reports make clear that the legislation was in direct response to 
the Federal Circuit’s decision119 and was designed “to clarify Congress’s 
original intent” with respect to the Whistleblower Protection Act.120
II. RESPONSES TO CONSTITUTIONAL RULINGS
Congress’s ability to respond to rulings by the Supreme Court on con-
stitutional grounds is more limited than in cases of statutory interpretation. 
The most obvious response—and the most difficult—is to seek to amend 
the Constitution. But that is not the only option. In some circumstances, 
116. MacLean, 135 S. Ct. at 920.
117. Rainey, 824 F.3d at 1361.
118. See H.R. 657, 115th Cong. (2017).
119. See S. REP. NO. 115-30, at 1–2 (2017); H.R. REP. NO. 115-67, at 2–3 (2017).
120. H.R. REP. NO. 115-67, at 3.
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Congress can also seek through legislation to limit the reach of a constitu-
tional ruling. In other situations, where the Court has invalidated a federal 
statute on constitutional grounds, Congress can seek to resurrect the statute, 
or a version of it, in a way that avoids the constitutional deficiency. Both 
approaches take for granted that on constitutional issues the Court has the 
decisive word and its rulings are to be accepted. Different approaches in-
volve rejection of the Court’s decisions and even of its power to decide. 
Bills introduced in the 115th Congress reflect each of these forms of re-
sponses to constitutional rulings by the Supreme Court. Beyond responding 
to decisions from the Court, Congress might also act preemptively by en-
acting a statute that addresses a constitutional issue before the Court weighs 
in. At least one bill introduced in the 115th Congress takes that approach.
A. Constitutional Amendment
When the Supreme Court issues a ruling on constitutional grounds, 
that ruling can be undone with a constitutional amendment. Article V em-
powers Congress to “propose Amendments to this Constitution” by a two-
thirds vote of both the Senate and the House.121 Given the arduous re-
quirements of Article V, amending the Constitution in response to a Su-
preme Court decision (or for other reasons) is difficult. But it is not 
impossible. The Eleventh Amendment overturned the Court’s decision in 
Chisholm v. Georgia;122 Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment over-
turned Dred Scott v. Sandford.123
In 2017, Democrats in the House and the Senate sponsored resolutions 
and bills seeking to amend the Constitution to overturn election law hold-
ings of the Court in Citizens United v. FEC,124 McCutcheon v. FEC,125 and
121. U.S. CONST. art. V.
122. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 420 (1793) (relying on the state-citizen diversity clause of Article III as
the basis for jurisdiction over an action by a South Carolina citizen to recover a debt from Georgia); see
Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1473 (1987) (explaining that the 
Eleventh Amendment “was undeniably designed to repudiate the majority analysis in Chisholm and
overrule its holding”).
123. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 406 (1857) (holding that no black person could be a citizen within the
meaning of Article III’s grant of diversity jurisdiction); see McDonald v. City of Chi., 561 U.S. 742, 
807–08 (2010) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“§ 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment . . . unambiguously over-
ruled this Court’s contrary holding in Dred Scott v. Sandford, that the Constitution did not recognize 
black Americans as citizens of the United States or their own State” (citation omitted)).
124. 558 U.S. 310, 365–66 (2010) (holding that under the First Amendment corporate funding of
independent political broadcasts in candidate elections cannot be limited).
125. 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1462 (2014) (holding that statutory aggregate limits on how much money a
donor may contribute in total to all political candidates or committees violated the First Amendment).
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Buckley v. Valeo.126 The principal effort is a proposed joint resolution 
sponsored in the House by Representative Theodore Deutch (Democrat of 
Florida) with 121 Democratic co-sponsors,127 and in the Senate by Tom 
Udall (Democrat of Minnesota) with forty Democratic co-sponsors.128 The 
joint resolution proposes a constitutional amendment that reads as follows:
Section 1. To advance democratic self-government and political equality, 
and to protect the integrity of government and the electoral process, 
Congress and the States may regulate and set reasonable limits on the
raising and spending of money by candidates and others to influence 
elections.
Section 2. Congress and the States shall have power to implement and 
enforce this article by appropriate legislation, and may distinguish be-
tween natural persons and corporations or other artificial entities created 
by law, including by prohibiting such entities from spending money to 
influence elections.
Section 3. Nothing in this article shall be construed to grant Congress or 
the States the power to abridge the freedom of the press.129
Such efforts are not new. The Court’s election decisions have long 
generated criticism, particularly among Democrats, who have sought simi-
lar constitutional amendments in prior congresses.130 There is no likelihood 
of any such amendment meeting the two-thirds requirements in the 115th 
Congress where Republicans exercise control.
B. Limiting the Reach of Constitutional Decisions
Besides seeking to amend the Constitution, Congress has other tools to 
limit the reach of or blunt the force of Supreme Court rulings based upon 
the Constitution. For example, following the Court’s 1973 decision in Roe 
126. 424 U.S. 1, 50, 54, 58 (1976)(holding that governmental restrictions of independent expendi-
tures in campaigns, limitations on expenditures by candidates from personal resources, and limitations 
on total campaign expenditures violate the First Amendment).
127. H.R.J. Res. 31, 115th Cong. (2017) (“Proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the
United States relating to contributions and expenditures intended to affect elections.”).
128. S.J. Res. 8, 115th Cong. (2017) (“Proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the United
States relating to contributions and expenditures intended to affect elections.”).
129. Id.; see also H.R. Res. 377, 115th Cong. (2017) (separate proposed resolution sponsored by
Rep. Richard Nolan (Democrat of Minn.) calling for a constitutional amendment but not supplying any 
proposed text for such an amendment). 
130. See, e.g., S.J. Res. 4, 114th Cong. (2015) (“Proposing an amendment to the Constitution of
the United States to restore the rights of the American people that were taken away by the Supreme 
Court’s decision in the Citizens United case and related decisions, to protect the integrity of our elec-
tions, and to limit the corrosive influence of money in our democratic process.”); H.R.J. Res. 34, 113th 
Cong. (2013) (same).
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v. Wade,131 Congress has attached abortion-funding restrictions to numer-
ous appropriations measures. Of particular note are the 1976 “Hyde
Amendment,” a funding provision for the Department of Health and Hu-
man Services limiting use of Medicaid funds for abortions,132 and that
amendment’s subsequent annual iterations.133 In a 1980 decision, the Su-
preme Court held that the Hyde Amendment “does not impinge on the due
process liberty recognized in Wade.”134 Similar statutory provisions prohib-
it the Department of Justice from using federal funds to pay for abortions in
federal prisons except in cases of rape or incest or where the life of the
mother is at risk;135 prohibit use of federal funds by the District of Colum-
bia to perform abortions except in cases of rape or incest or to protect the
life of the mother;136 and limit uses of funds by international organizations
such as the United Nations Population Fund.137
In the 115th Congress there are several pending bills, sponsored by 
Republicans, that impose restrictions upon uses of federal funds for abor-
tion services,138 including a bill that has passed the House to make the 
Hyde Amendment permanent rather than dependent upon annual appropria-
tion measures.139 From the other side of the political aisle there are also 
bills to lift past restrictions on federal funding of abortions.140
At the same time that Democrats have pursued a constitutional 
amendment to overturn Citizens United and other election decisions, they 
131. 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment protects the right to obtain
an abortion).
132. Pub. L. No. 94-439, § 209, 90 Stat. 1418, 1434 (1976).
133. See MARY ZIEGLER, AFTER ROE: THE LOST HISTORY OF THE ABORTION DEBATE 121–41 
(2015) (providing a detailed discussion of the history of the Hyde Amendment). 
134. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 318 (1980).
135. Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2017, Pub. L. 115-31, §§ 202–03, 131 Stat. 135, 208 
(codified in scattered sections of 2, 7, 8, 10, 16, 30, 42, 43, 48, 49, 50 U.S.C.).
136. Id. § 810, 131 Stat. at 393.
137. Id. § 7082, 131 Stat at 717.
138. See, e.g., No Abortion Bonds Act, H.R. 4131, 115th Cong. (2017); H.R. 2019, 115th Cong.
(2017) (“To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to exclude certain abortions from the definition 
of qualified medical expenses for purposes of distributions from health savings accounts.”); Title X 
Abortion Provider Prohibition Act, H.R. 217, 115th Cong. (2017).
139. See No Taxpayer Funding for Abortion and Abortion Insurance Full Disclosure Act of 2017,
H.R. 7, 115th Cong. § 101 (2017) (providing that “[n]o funds authorized or appropriated by Federal 
law, and none of the funds in any trust fund to which funds are authorized or appropriated by Federal 
law, shall be expended for any abortion,” unless “the pregnancy is the result of an act of rape or incest,”
or “a woman suffers from a physical disorder, physical injury, or physical illness that would, as certified 
by a physician, place the woman in danger of death unless an abortion is performed, including a life-
endangering physical condition caused by or arising from the pregnancy itself”).
140. See, e.g., Equal Access to Abortion Coverage in Health Insurance (EACH Woman) Act of
2017, H.R. 771, 115th Cong. § 3(a) (2017) (“The Federal Government shall . . . ensure coverage for 
abortion care in public health insurance programs including Medicaid, Medicare, and the Children’s
Health Insurance Program . . . .”).
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have also proposed legislation to limit the effects of those decisions. For 
example, the Democratic-sponsored We the People Democracy Reform Act 
of 2017 offers a long list of electoral reforms including: the creation of a
small-donor, public matching funds system for presidential and congres-
sional elections; requiring forty-eight-hour disclosure for contributions to 
candidates and parties of $1000 or more; prohibiting individual-candidate 
Super PACs; creating nonpartisan redistricting commissions to draw con-
gressional districts; establishing a system of automatic voter registration; 
providing for same-day voter registration; and requiring the President to 
divest assets that create potential conflicts of interest into a blind trust and 
to disclose personal income tax returns.141 Democrats have also sponsored 
a variety of other bills regulating elections and electoral spending.142
While Democrats have focused their energies on the Court’s election 
cases, some Republicans have sought to address the reach of the Court’s 
controversial Kelo v. City of New London143 decision. The Private Property 
Protection Act of 2017, sponsored by James Sensenbrenner (Republican of 
Wisconsin), would prohibit the federal government and any state or local
government that receives federal economic development funds from exer-
cising eminent domain “over property to be used for economic develop-
ment.”144 Representative Sensenbrenner has sponsored similar legislation 
on multiple prior occasions.145 Kelo has also been a popular target for prior 
Congresses.146
Finally, in December of 2017, Senator Tammi Duckworth (Democrat 
of Illinois) and Representative Mark Takano (Democrat of California) in-
troduced the Korematsu–Takai Civil Liberties Protection Act.147 The bill 
141. H.R. 3848, 115th Cong. (2017); S. 1880, 115th Cong. (2017). Notably, the Act purports to
give individual members of Congress the right to challenge any provision of the law on constitutional 
grounds and to intervene in any action in which any provision of the constitutionality of the Act is 
challenged.
142. See, e.g., Conflicts from Political Fundraising Act of 2017, S. 1184, 115th Cong. (2017);
Conflicts from Political Fundraising Act of 2017, H.R. 2493, 115th Cong. (2017).
143. 545 U.S. 469, 484 (2005) (holding that a city’s taking of private property to sell to private
developers pursuant to an economic development plan qualified as a “public use” within the meaning of 
the Takings Clause).
144. H.R. 1689, 115th Cong. § 2(a) (2017).
145. See H.R. 3013, 114th Cong. (2015); H.R.1944, 113th Cong. (2014); H.R.1433, 112th Cong.
(2011).
146. See, e.g., Protection of Homes, Small Businesses, and Private Property Act of 2012, S. 3334,
112th Cong. § 2 (2012); H.R. Res. 329, 112th Cong. (2011) (“Expressing support for the private proper-
ty rights protections guaranteed by the 5th Amendment to the Constitution on the 6th anniversary of the 
Supreme Court’s decision of Kelo v. City of New London.”); H.R. Res. 880, 109th Cong. (2006) (“Ex-
pressing the sense of the House on the occasion of the first anniversary of the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Kelo v. City of New London.”).
147. S. 2250, 115th Cong. (2017); H.R. 4680, 115th Cong. (2017).
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honors Fred Korematsu, the U.S. citizen of Japanese ancestry whose con-
viction for violating military evacuation orders following the attack on 
Pearl Harbor was upheld by the Supreme Court,148 and the late U.S. Repre-
sentative Mark Takai of Hawaii. The bill states in its findings that although 
the Court’s Korematsu ruling has been generally repudiated, the “case is 
still used as a justification for discrimination under the guise of national 
security.”149 Accordingly, the proposed legislation provides that “[n]o indi-
vidual may be imprisoned or otherwise detained based solely on an actual 
or perceived protected characteristic of the individual.”150 It defines “pro-
tected characteristic” to include race, ethnicity, national origin, religion, 
gender, gender identity, and sexual orientation.151
C. Resurrecting Invalidated Statutes
When the Supreme Court invalidates a statute on constitutional 
grounds, Congress might also seek to resurrect the law by repairing the 
constitutional deficiency. For example, in response to the Court’s 1995
decision in United States v. Lopez,152 Congress in 1996 amended the inval-
idated Gun-Free Schools Zone Act by adding an interstate commerce ele-
ment.153 After the Court’s ruling in United States v. Alvarez that a 
prohibition on making false claims about receiving military honors violated 
the First Amendment,154 Congress enacted a more limited prohibition mak-
ing it a crime to make false claims about military honors for financial gain 
or other profit.155
In response to the Supreme Court’s decision in Shelby County v.
Holder, invalidating the coverage formula of the Voting Rights Act,156
there have been repeated efforts in Congress to adopt a new formula that 
would satisfy judicial review.157 Such bills have been sponsored mostly by 
148. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
149. S. 2250 § 2(31).
150. Id. § 3.
151. Id.
152. 514 U.S. 549, 551 (1995) (invalidating the federal Gun-Free School Zones Act as beyond
Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause).
153. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2)(A) (2016) (“It shall be unlawful for any individual knowingly to
possess a firearm that has moved in or that otherwise affects interstate or foreign commerce at a place 
that the individual knows, or has reasonable cause to believe, is a school zone.”).
154. 567 U.S. 709, 729–30 (2012).
155. See 18 U.S.C. § 704(b) (2016) (“Whoever, with intent to obtain money, property, or other
tangible benefit, fraudulently holds oneself out to be a recipient of a decoration or medal . . . shall be 
fined under this title, imprisoned not more than one year, or both.”).
156. 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2630 (2013).
157. See, e.g., Voting Rights Amendment Act of 2014, H.R. 3899, 113th Cong. § 3 (2014); Voting
Rights Amendment Act of 2014, S. 1945, 113th Cong. § 3 (2014).
2018] CONGRESS AND THE SUPREME COURT 397
Democrats but have attracted also some modest Republican support, par-
ticularly in the House.158 The Voting Rights Advancement Act of 2017 was 
introduced by Senator Leahy (Democrat of Vermont) with forty-six co-
sponsors (no Republicans). Among other things, it would subject a state 
(and all of its political subdivisions) with fifteen or more voting rights vio-
lations during the previous twenty-five years, or ten or more violations 
during the previous twenty-five years, at least one of which was committed 
by the state itself (as opposed to a political subdivision within it), to ten 
years of federal oversight.159 Representative Terri Sewell (Democrat of 
California) sponsored a companion bill in the House with 188 Democrats 
as co-sponsors.160 Meanwhile, Representative James Sensenbrenner spon-
sored a different bill that would subject a state to oversight if, during the 
prior fifteen years, there were five or more voting rights violations, at least 
one of which was committed by the state itself.161 The same bill would
also subject to oversight political subdivisions with either three or more 
voting rights violations or with one or more voting rights violations and 
low minority turnout during the previous fifteen years.162 Of the bill’s sev-
enty-nine co-sponsors, nine are Republicans.163
To be sure, when Congress resurrects invalidated legislation it remains 
possible that the Supreme Court will also find the modified statute invalid. 
Thus, even if Congress succeeds in adopting a new formula for the Voting 
Rights Act—something Chief Justice Roberts had signaled was needed four 
years before he authored Shelby County164—there is no guarantee that the 
Court will rule it constitutional just because it has been enacted by a new 
Congress.
158.  See Cosponsors: H.R.3899—113th Congress (2013–2014), CONGRESS.GOV,
https://www.congress.gov/bill/113th-congress/house-bill/3899/cosponsors [https://perma.cc/893Y-
ANM4]. 
159.  S. 1419, 115th Cong. § 4(a)(1) (2017).
160.  See Cosponsors: H.R.2978—115th Congress (2017–2018), CONGRESS.GOV,
https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-bill/2978/cosponsors?overview=closed 
[https://perma.cc/V9SL-6ZCT].
161.  Voting Rights Amendment Act of 2017, H.R. 3239, 115th Cong. § 3(a)(1) (2017).
162.  Id.
163.  See Cosponsors: H.R.3239—115th Congress (2017–2018), CONGRESS.GOV,
https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-bill/3239/cosponsors [https://perma.cc/L86J-
E3CB].
164.  Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 211 (2009) (“More than 40
years ago, this Court concluded that ‘exceptional conditions’ prevailing in certain parts of the country 
justified extraordinary legislation otherwise unfamiliar to our federal system. . . . Whether conditions 
continue to justify such legislation is a difficult constitutional question we do not answer today.” (cita-
tion omitted)).
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D. Defiance
Congress might also defy the Court. Defiance can take various forms. 
On the softer end of the spectrum, Congress might issue resolutions an-
nouncing the Court is wrong about the Constitution. Stronger forms of 
defiance might involve legislation that affirms an invalidated statute to see 
if the Court will strike it down the next time around. At the far extreme, 
Congress might adopt jurisdiction-stripping measures to prevent the Court 
from deciding a contested issue, punish the Court (e.g., through budgetary 
measures), or even just ignore a ruling.
In 2017, various resolutions criticize rulings of the Court, particularly 
its election cases.165 At the same time, other resolutions applaud what the 
Court has done and seek to draw upon its decisions for other purposes.166
The issue of abortion has generated concrete efforts to defy the Court. 
The Pain-Capable Unborn Child Protection Act, approved by the House in 
October 2017, would criminalize abortions “if the probable post-
fertilization age . . . of the unborn child is 20 weeks or greater.”167 The 
legislation is based on “substantial medical evidence that an unborn child is 
capable of experiencing pain at least by 20 weeks after fertilization, if not 
earlier.”168 While the bill contains exceptions where an abortion is neces-
sary to save the life of the mother or where the pregnancy has resulted from
rape or, in the case of minors, incest,169 it lacks the maternal health excep-
tion required by the Court’s cases.170 So, too, the proposed Prenatal Non-
165.  See, e.g., H.R. Res. 389, 115th Cong. (2017) (“[T]he case of Citizens United v.
FEC . . . opened the door to the corrupting influence of money in politics . . . .”). In the year in which 
the Court heard Gill v. Whitford, 137 S. Ct. 2268 (2017), Rep. Alan Lowenthal (Democrat of Cal.), 
joined by sixteen Democratic and one Republican colleague, sponsored a resolution reading: “That it is 
the sense of the House of Representatives that congressional redistricting should be reformed to remove 
political gerrymandering.” H.R. Res. 283, 115th Cong. (2017).
166.  H.R. Res. 12, 115th Cong. (2017) (endorsing the Court’s decision in Walker v. Tex. Div.,
Sons of Confederate Veterans, 135 S. Ct. 2239 (2015), that messages on state license plates constitute 
“‘government speech,’ not private speech protected by the First Amendment,” and calling on govern-
ment actors to avoid speech that “promotes or displays symbols, signs, and vestiges of racism, oppres-
sion, and intimidation”); H.R. Res. 405, 115th Cong. (2017) (expressing support for the designation of 
June 26, 2017, as “LGBT Equality Day,” in light of the date of the Court’s decisions in Lawrence v. 
Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (2013), and Obergefell v. Hodges, 
135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015)); S. Res. 202, 115th Cong. (2017) (also expressing support for “LGBT Equality 
Day,” and referencing the same Court decisions).
167.  H.R. 36, 115th Cong. § 3(a) (2017).
168.  Id. § 2(11).
169.  Id. § 3(a). Where an exception applies, “a physician terminating or attempting to terminate a
pregnancy . . . may do so only in the manner which, in reasonable medical judgment, provides the best 
opportunity for the unborn child to survive.” Id.
170.  See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 879 (1992)
(“[S]ubsequent to viability, the State in promoting its interest in the potentiality of human life may, if it 
chooses, regulate, and even proscribe, abortion except where it is necessary, in appropriate medical 
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discrimination Act,171 deemed by its Republican sponsors to promote 
equality for women,172 criminalizes—without any exceptions—abortions 
performed because of the sex of the fetus.173
A separate abortion-related bill is the proposed Sanctity of Act Life of 
2017. Sponsored by Representative Walter B. Jones, Jr. (Republican of 
North Carolina), this bill states in its findings that: “Congress finds that 
uncontroverted scientific evidence has always shown that actual human life 
exists from the moment of conception” and that “each State has a compel-
ling interest in protecting the lives of those within the State’s jurisdiction
whom the State rationally regards as human beings.”174 The bill prohibits
review by the Supreme Court and by federal district courts of government 
action that, among other things, “(1) protects the rights of human persons 
between conception and birth, or (2) prohibits, limits, or regulates (a) the 
performance of abortions or (b) the provision of public expense of funds, 
facilities, personnel, or other assistance for the performance of abor-
tions.”175 Similar jurisdiction-stripping bills have been regularly 
introduced in Congress for many years.176
Finally, one member of the House, Steve King (Republican of Iowa) 
has introduced a bill barring the Supreme Court from ever citing three cas-
es it decided involving the Affordable Care Act.177 The bill is a curious 
proposal: besides raising an obvious issue of separation of powers, the bill 
includes in its targets both National Federation of Independent Business v. 
judgment, for the preservation of the life or health of the mother.” (quoting Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 
164–65 (1973)). But see Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 166–67 (2007) (upholding federal “Partial-
Birth Abortion Ban Act” despite lack of health exception where “there is uncertainty over whether the 
barred procedure is ever necessary to preserve a woman’s health, given the availability of other abortion 
procedures that are considered to be safe alternatives”).
171.  H.R. 4660, 115th Cong. (2017).
172.  Id. § 2
173.  Id. § 3.
174.  H.R. 3676, 115th Cong. §§ 2(a)–(b) (2017).
175.  Id. §§ 3(a), 4.
176.  See, e.g., Sanctity of Life Act of 2013, H.R. 2764, 113th Cong. (2013); Sanctity of Life Act of
2007, H.R. 2597, 110th Cong. (2007); Sanctity of Life Act of 1995, H.R. 2087, 104th Cong. (1995); A 
Bill to Provide That Human Life Shall Be Deemed to Exist from Conception, S. 158, 97th Cong.
(1981).
177.  H.R. 177, 115th Cong. (2017). The bill’s only section provides:
Under Article 3, Section 2, which allows Congress to provide exceptions and regulations
for Supreme Court consideration of cases and controversies, the following cases are barred 
from citation for the purpose of precedence in all future cases after enactment: Nat’l Fed’n of 
Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2573, 183 L. Ed. 2d 450 (2012) and King v. Burwell, 
135 S. Ct. 2480, 2485, 192 L. Ed. 2d 483 (2015) and Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores Inc.,
134 S. Ct. 2751, 2782, 189 L. Ed. 2d 675 (2014). 
Id.
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Sebelius, which upheld the individual mandate,178 and Burwell v. Hobby 
Lobby Stores, which applied broadly the Religious Freedom Restoration 
Act.179 The bill also only prohibits citing the identified prior decisions but 
evidently leaves the Court free to rely upon the reasoning of those deci-
sions. No other members of Congress have signed on as sponsors of this 
bill.
E. Going First
Congress can also weigh in on constitutional questions before they 
reach the Supreme Court. The Protecting Data at the Border Act would do 
that.180 Sponsored by Democrats, this bill aims to extend full Fourth 
Amendment protections to digital devices and digital content at U.S. bor-
ders. Citing the Court’s 2014 ruling in Riley v. California that a warrantless 
search of cellphone data following an arrest violates the Fourth Amend-
ment,181 the bill asserts that:
Accessing the digital contents of electronic equipment, accessing the 
digital contents of an online account, or obtaining information regarding 
the nature of the online presence of a United States person entering or 
exiting the United States, without a lawful warrant based on probable 
cause, is unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution 
of the United States.182
Accordingly, the bill provides that absent exigent circumstances border 
officers must obtain a warrant before searching electronic equipment and it 
prohibits officers from denying or delaying entry by U.S. persons into the 
United States based upon their refusal to provide access to their devices or 
online accounts.183 The Supreme Court has not addressed whether Riley
extends to border searches, a context where, in prior cases the Court has 
held that the government has considerable leeway to conduct searches.184
178.  567 U.S. 519, 574 (2012).
179.  134 S. Ct. 2751, 2785 (2014) (holding that as applied to closely held corporations, Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services regulations imposing a contraceptive mandate violate RFRA).
180.  S. 823, 115th Cong. (2017).
181.  134 S. Ct. 2473, 2485 (2014).
182.  S. 823 § 2(4).
183.  Id. § 5.
184.  See, e.g., United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 152 (2004) (upholding a warrantless 
border search of a vehicle, including removal and disassembly of the gas tank, despite the lack of 
reasonable suspicion for the search); United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 616 (1977) (“[S]earches 
made at the border, pursuant to the long-standing right of the sovereign to protect itself by stopping and 
examining persons and property crossing into this country, are reasonable simply by virtue of the fact 
that they occur at the border.”); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 566 (1976) (rejecting 
Fourth Amendment challenge to stops by border control officers at checkpoints on highways within the 
vicinity of the U.S.–Mexico border).
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With reports that border agents increasingly search cellphones and digital 
devices at the borders,185 the Court is likely to have a challenge to these 
practices on its docket in the near future. It is possible that the Court will 
take a different view of the Fourth Amendment issue than do members of 
Congress who support the pending legislation. In this instance, however, 
disagreement need not mean invalidation of a statute: even if Congress is 
wrong on what the Fourth Amendment requires, it can, as a statutory mat-
ter, impose upon federal border agents stronger restrictions than what the 
Constitution itself demands.
III. REGULATING THE COURT
In addition to responding to rulings by the Supreme Court in specific 
cases or specific areas of the law, Congress can also seek to regulate the 
Court in various ways. In 2017, members of Congress proposed legislative 
measures requiring the Court to adopt a code of judicial ethics and to per-
mit cameras in the Courtroom.
A. Judicial Ethics
The Justices of the Supreme Court are the only members of the federal 
judiciary who are not bound by the detailed Code of Conduct for United 
States Judges, promulgated by the Judicial Conference of the United States. 
Many commentators have expressed the view that the Justices should be 
bound by the same rules of ethics that apply to judges of lower federal 
courts.186 Although the Code of Conduct covers a range of issues, the lack 
of an ethical code for the Court receives most attention when the Justices 
185.  See Ron Nixon, Searches of Devices Increasing at Border, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 2018, at A14.
186.  See, e.g., Elizabeth Warren, The Supreme Court Has an Ethics Problem, POLITICO MAG.
(Nov. 1, 2017), https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/11/01/supreme-court-ethics-problem-
elizabeth-warren-opinion-215772 [https://perma.cc/2HVG-5FQD] (“It is time to begin rebuilding 
American’s confidence in the court by establishing a formal code of conduct.”); Letter from Mark N. 
Aaronson, Professor of Law, Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of Law et al., to Chief Justice Roberts & 
Assoc. Justices of the Supreme Court (Mar. 5, 2012), https://www.afj.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/09/law-prof-letter-to-scotus-3-5-12.pdf [https://perma.cc/ABG3-JT92] (“We 
write to encourage the Supreme Court to initiate the process of formally adopting the Code of Conduct 
for U.S. Judges, and to implement a mechanism for reviewing a Justice’s decision whether or not to 
recuse from a case.”); Editorial, The Court’s Recusal Problem, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 16, 2011), 
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9C0DE6DE113EF935A25750C0A9679D8B63 
[https://perma.cc/UV5S-4G45] (“The court’s lack of a recusal policy leaves each justice to decide 
whether he or she is meeting that standard. That plainly violates the age-old legal principle: Nemo iudex 
in causa sua—no one should be a judge about his or her own case. It damages the justices’ credibility 
and the court’s authority.”); Caprice L. Roberts, The Fox Guarding the Henhouse? Recusal and the 
Procedural Void in the Court of Last Resort, 57 RUTGERS L. REV. 107, 182 (2004) (“[T]he Supreme 
Court’s historic recusal practice of solely individual decision-making warrants a procedural overhaul.”).
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recuse—or do not recuse—themselves from particular cases. Like other 
federal judges, the Justices are governed by the federal recusal statute. It 
provides that “[a]ny justice, judge, or magistrate judge of the United States 
shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might 
reasonably be questioned.”187 The statute also sets out some specific cir-
cumstances in which recusal is required, including where the judge has a 
“personal bias or prejudice concerning a party,” “served as lawyer in the 
matter in controversy” while in private practice, or “knows that he, individ-
ually or as a fiduciary, or his spouse or minor child residing in his house-
hold, has a financial interest in the subject matter in controversy.”188
However, the more detailed recusal rules of the Code of Conduct and the 
advisory opinions the Judicial Conference issues based upon those rules do 
not apply to the Supreme Court and, in contrast to recusal decisions of low-
er-court judges, which may be appealed,189 nobody reviews recusal deci-
sions by the Justices. Individual Justices decide for themselves whether 
recusal is appropriate and with rare exception they do not publicly disclose 
their reasons for their decisions even when litigants have filed recusal mo-
tions.190
In his 2011 Annual Report, Chief Justice Roberts responded to calls 
for a code of conduct to apply to members of his Court.191 He explained 
first that “[b]ecause the Judicial Conference is an instrument for the man-
agement of the lower federal courts, its committees have no mandate to 
prescribe rules or standards for any other body.”192 Nonetheless, Roberts 
emphasized, it is a “misconception[ ]” to think that “the Supreme Court is 
exempt from the ethical principles that lower courts observe.”193 He report-
ed that “[a]ll Members of the Court do in fact consult the Code of Conduct 
in assessing their ethical obligations,” because “[e]very Justice seeks to 
follow high ethical standards, and the Judicial Conference’s Code of Con-
duct provides a current and uniform source of guidance designed with spe-
cific reference to the needs and obligations of the federal judiciary.”194 In
187.  28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (2016).
188.  Id. § 455(b).
189.  On appeal, denial of a recusal motion is reviewed for abuse of discretion. See, e.g., Gwynn v.
Walker (In re Walker), 532 F.3d 1304, 1308 (11th Cir. 2008).
190.  One recent exception is Justice Scalia’s response to a recusal motion by the Sierra Club in
Cheney v. U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, 541 U.S. 913 (2004), following his duck-
hunting trip with Vice President Cheney.
191.  JOHN G. ROBERTS JR., 2011 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 3 (2011),
https://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/year-end/2011year-endreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/CF8W-
GZS4].
192.  Id. at 4.
193.  Id.
194.  Id. at 4–5.
2018] CONGRESS AND THE SUPREME COURT 403
addition, Roberts stated that the Justices also rely upon other sources of 
ethical guidance: “They may turn to judicial opinions, treatises, scholarly 
articles, and disciplinary decisions. They may also seek advice from the 
Court’s Legal Office, from the Judicial Conference’s Committee on Codes 
of Conduct, and from their colleagues.”195
With respect to recusal, however, Roberts explained why the Supreme 
Court necessarily operates differently than other courts. He observed that 
there could be no appellate review of a Justice’s recusal decision because 
under the Constitution there is only one Supreme Court; members of the 
Court also cannot determine whether their colleagues should recuse be-
cause that process would produce “an undesirable situation in which the 
Court could affect the outcome of a case by selecting who among its Mem-
bers may participate.”196 Further, in contrast to the lower courts where 
recusal results in a different judge participating, at the Supreme Court, “if a 
Justice withdraws from a case, the Court must sit without its full member-
ship” and thus “[a] Justice accordingly cannot withdraw from a case as a 
matter of convenience or simply to avoid controversy.”197 Noting that “the 
limits of Congress’s power to require recusal have never been tested,”198
Roberts asserted that he has “complete confidence in the capability of [his] 
colleagues to determine when recusal is warranted.”199
Since 2013, Representative Louise Slaughter (Democrat of New York) 
has sponsored the Supreme Court Ethics Act, legislation requiring the 
Court to adopt a code of ethics.200 Joined by eighty Democrats, Representa-
tive Slaughter sponsored the same bill in 2017.201 A companion bill was 
sponsored by Senator Chris Murphy (Democrat of Connecticut) with ten 
Democratic co-sponsors in the Senate.202 The proposed legislation pro-
vides:
The Supreme Court of the United States shall, not later than 180 
days after the date of the enactment of this Act, promulgate a code of 
ethics for the Justices of the Supreme Court that shall include the 5 can-
ons of the Code of Conduct for United States Judges adopted by the Ju-
dicial Conference of the United States, with any amendments or 
modifications thereto that the Supreme Court determines appropriate.
195.  Id. at 5.
196.  Id. at 9.
197.  Id.
198.  Id. at 7.
199.  Id. at 10.
200.  H.R. 2902, 113th Cong. (2013).
201.  H.R. 1960, 115th Cong. (2017). 
202.  S. 835, 115th Cong. (2017).
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As to the source of congressional power to enact this legislation, the 
bill states that “Congress has the authority to regulate the administration of 
the Supreme Court of the United States” and gives as examples congres-
sional control of the number of Justices and the number required for a 
quorum, the dates of the Court’s terms, and the salaries of the Justices.203
The bill also references as precedent the requirement, in the 1978 Ethics in 
Government Act, that members of the Court (like other federal officials) 
file annual financial disclosure statements.204
B. Cameras in the Courtroom
Many people would like the oral arguments at the Supreme Court to 
be televised. The Justices have never permitted real-time broadcasting of 
their arguments. Instead, after oral argument the Court makes available 
same-day transcripts205 and releases audio recordings at the end of the ar-
gument week.206 On rare occasions, and without explanation, the Court has 
released audio recordings on the same day an argument occurs.207 Members 
of the Court have offered various justifications for these practices.208
203.  Id. § 2(a)(3).
204.  See 5 U.S.C. app. §§ 101–111 (2016) (requiring federal judges to file annual personal finan-
THE 
cial statements).
     .   See        Argument Transcripts, SUPREME COURT       OF                       U.S.,
https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcript/2017 [https://perma.cc/Y7WQ-
PFFK] (“[O]ral argument transcripts . . . are posted on this website on the same day an argument is 
heard by the Supreme Court. Same-day transcripts are considered official but subject to final review.”).
206.  See Argument Audio, SUPREME COURT OF THE U.S.,
https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_audio/2017 [https://perma.cc/YKR7-23SB] 
(“The audio recordings of all oral arguments heard by the Supreme Court of the United States are 
available to the public at the end of each argument week. The audio recordings are posted on Fridays 
after Conference.”).
207.  For example, the Court released audio on the same day it heard United States v. Windsor, 570
U.S. 744 (2013); Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012); District of Columbia v. 
Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008); and Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
208. See, e.g., A Bill to Permit the Televising of Supreme Court Proceedings, S. REP. NO. 110-448,
at 6 (2008) (“The discussions that the Justices have with the attorneys during oral arguments is a splen-
did dynamic. If you introduce cameras, it is human nature for me to suspect that one of my colleagues is 
saying something for a soundbite. Please don’t introduce that insidious dynamic into what is now a 
collegial court. Our court works.” (quoting Financial Services and General Government Appropriations 
for Fiscal Year 2008: Hearing Before the Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on Appropriations, 110th Cong. 
(2007) (statement of Justice Anthony Kennedy)); id. at 8 (“It runs the risk of undermining the manner in 
which we consider the cases. Certainly it will change our proceedings. And I don’t think for the better.” 
(quoting Departments of Transportation, Treasury, HUD, the Judiciary, District of Columbia, and 
Independent Agencies Appropriations for 2007: Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on 
Appropriations, 109th Cong. 225 (2006) (statement of Justice Clarence Thomas)); id. (“The best reason 
against it is the problem that we could become a symbol since we are the Supreme Court, and if it was 
in our court, it would be in every court in the country, criminal cases included.” (quoting Interview by 
Brian Lamb, C-SPAN, with Stephen Breyer, Assoc. Justice, Supreme Court of the U.S. (Dec. 4, 2005) 
(statement of Justice Breyer)); Alex Swoyer, Justice Sotomayor Says Cameras Intrude on the Supreme 
Court’s Process, WASH. TIMES (Sept. 21, 2017),
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As in prior years, in 2017, members of Congress introduced legisla-
tion to increase public access to the Court’s arguments. One bill, the Cam-
eras in the Courtroom Act, is sponsored in the House by Gerald Connolly 
(Democrat of Virginia) joined by ten Democratic and one Republican col-
league209 and in the Senate by Dick Durbin (Democrat of Illinois) joined by 
three Democrats and one Republican.210 It is a straightforward measure that 
provides as follows:
The Supreme Court shall permit television coverage of all open sessions 
of the Court unless the Court decides, by a vote of the majority of justic-
es, that allowing such coverage in a particular case would constitute a 
violation of the due process rights of 1 or more of the parties before the 
Court.211
A separate Democratic-sponsored House bill, the Eyes on the Courts 
Act of 2017, would require the presiding judge of all federal appellate 
courts, including the Supreme Court, to “permit the photographing, elec-
tronic recording, audio-visual coverage, broadcasting, televising, or stream-
ing in real time or near-real time on the Internet” of all courtroom 
proceedings unless doing so would “violate the due process rights of a par-
ty to the proceeding or is otherwise not in the interests of justice.”212 A bill 
backed by Republicans and Democrats in the Senate, the Sunshine in the 
Courtroom Act of 2017, would “authorize” federal courts, including the 
Supreme Court, to permit photographing, electronic recording, broadcast-
ing or televising of proceedings, leaving the decision to do these things in 
the “discretion” of the presiding judge.213
In September of 2017, four Democratic members of the House who 
sponsored the Cameras in the Courtroom Act sent a letter to Chief Justice 
Roberts requesting that the Court provide for live audio streaming via its 
website of the argument in Gill v. Whitford, a case involving claims of 
unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering.214 Jeffrey P. Minear, Counselor 
to the Chief Justice, responded:
https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2017/sep/21/sonia-sotomayor-cameras-intrude-supreme-
courts-pro/ [https://perma.cc/7JKK-GAX4] (“Cameras change the institution and education is not 
unimportant, but it’s not the answer for ensuring that there is actually a discussion going on that can be 
looked at by others in writing.” (quoting Justice Sonia Sotomayor)).
209. H.R. 464, 115th Cong. (2017).
210. S. 649, 115th Cong. (2017).
211. Id. § 2(a).
212. H.R. 1025, 115th Cong. § 2(b)(1) (2017).
213. S. 643, 115th Cong. § 2(b)(1) (2017).
214. See Letter from Gerald E. Connolly, U.S. Congressman, et al. to John G. Roberts, Jr., Chief 
Justice. of the U. S. (Sept. 29, 2017), 
https://connolly.house.gov/uploadedfiles/9292017_joint_letter_to_chief_justice_roberts_live_audio_gill
_v_whitford.pdf [https://perma.cc/425L-PVTW].
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The Chief Justice appreciates and shares your ultimate goal of in-
creasing public transparency and improving public understanding of the 
Supreme Court. I am sure you are, however, familiar with the Justices’ 
concerns surrounding the live broadcast or streaming of oral arguments, 
which could adversely affect the character and quality of the dialogue 
between the attorneys and Justices.215
The request was, accordingly, denied.
IV. CONGRESSIONAL MODESTY
A review of Congress’s activities in 2017 shows that members of the 
federal legislative branch are quite modest when it comes to the Supreme 
Court. No legislation Congress enacted in 2017 overrides any statutory 
decision of the Supreme Court. The one successful statutory override tar-
geted not the Supreme Court, but the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Federal Circuit for an erroneous use of a Supreme Court precedent.
With respect to Supreme Court decisions based upon the Constitution, 
a review of congressional activities in 2017 shows that members of Con-
gress sometimes protest what the Court has done but, with rare exception, 
they accept the Court’s rulings and the power of the Court to rule. Mem-
bers of Congress therefore see their practical options as mostly limited to 
blunting the effect of constitutional decisions (such as in the election, abor-
tion, and property takings areas) while taking for granted that the Court 
retains power to decide whether legislation is or is not consistent with the 
Constitution.
Similarly, with respect to regulating the Court itself, Congress is not 
particularly ambitious. Regulatory proposals in 2017 took the form of in-
creased access to oral arguments and adoption of a code of ethics. But even 
in those two instances the proposed measures leave a good deal of discre-
tion in the hands of the Justices.
Congressional modesty is not inevitable. One could imagine a Repub-
lican-controlled Congress, particularly when there is a Republican Presi-
dent, targeting any number of Supreme Court decisions from recent years: 
the affirmative action cases;216 the same-sex marriage cases;217 Lee. v. 
215. Letter from Jeffrey P. Minear, Counselor to the Chief Justice, to Gerald E. Connolly, U.S. 
Congressman, et al. (Oct. 2, 2017), https://arstechnica.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/scotusletter.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/PN9G-2MW3].
216. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 341–43 (2003) (rejecting Equal Protection 
challenge to admissions practices at University of Michigan Law School where race of a candidate may 
be a factor in generating a diverse class).
217. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604–05 (2015) (holding state-law bans on same-
sex marriages invalid under the Fourteenth Amendment); United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 
2695–96 (2013) (invalidating, with respect to same-sex marriages sanctioned by state governments, the 
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Weisman;218 Miller v. Alabama;219 Dickerson v. United States;220 and Texas
v. Johnson,221 among others. So, too, it is possible to imagine a whole se-
ries of legislative overhauls, instead of a little tinkering around the edges 
with respect to broadcasting oral arguments and new ethical rules. Com-
pared to the sorts of proposals that academics have put forth—changing the 
size of the Court;222 term limits for the Justices;223 altering the Court’s 
docket;224 requiring the Justices to ride circuit again;225 overhauling the 
selection and confirmation process;226 “taking the Constitution away from” 
provision of the Defense of Marriage Act recognizing for purposes of federal law only marriages be-
tween a man and a woman).
218. 505 U.S. 577, 598 (1992) (holding that inclusion of invocation and benediction prayers at 
graduation ceremonies at public middle schools and high schools violates the Establishment Clause).
219. 567 U.S. 460, 489 (2012) (holding that mandatory life imprisonment without parole for 
defendants under eighteen at the time they committed their crimes violates the Eighth Amendment).
220. 530 U.S. 428, 444 (2000) (holding that Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), was a 
constitutional decision that cannot be superseded by an Act of Congress).
221. 491 U.S. 397, 420 (1989) (holding that criminal prosecution for desecrating the U.S. flag 
violates the First Amendment).
222. See, e.g., Tracey E. George & Chris Guthrie, Remaking the United States Supreme Court in 
the Courts’ of Appeals Image, 58 DUKE L.J. 1439 (2009) (proposing an increase in the size of the 
Supreme Court from nine to fifteen Justices in order to increase the Court’s capacity).
223. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & James Lindgren, Term Limits for the Supreme Court: Life 
Tenure Reconsidered, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 769 (2006) (recommending a constitutional 
amendment to institute a system of staggered, eighteen-year term limits for Supreme Court Justices).
224. See, e.g., Paul D. Carrington & Roger C. Cramton, Judicial Independence in Excess: Reviving 
the Judicial Duty of the Supreme Court, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 587 (2009) (recommending the creation 
of a “certiorari division” of Article III judges to select cases for the Supreme Court); Daniel Epps & 
William Ortman, The Lottery Docket, 116 MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2928275 [https://perma.cc/76VQ-YLR4] (propos-
ing supplementing the Supreme Court’s caseload with a “lottery docket” of cases selected at random
from final judgments of the circuit courts in order to have the Court hear run-of-the-mill disputes); 
Amanda L. Tyler, Setting the Supreme Court’s Agenda: Is There a Place for Certification?, 78 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1310 (2010) (proposing that federal courts be permitted to certify questions to the 
Supreme Court).
225. See, e.g., David R. Stras, Why Supreme Court Justices Should Ride Circuit Again, 91 MINN.
L. REV. 1710, 1712 (2007) (“A modern form of circuit riding would ensure that Justices gain exposure 
to a wider array of legal issues, the laws of various states, and the difficulties faced by lower courts in 
implementing the Court’s sweeping (and sometimes confounding) rulings.”).
226. See, e.g., RICHARD DAVIS, ELECTING JUSTICE: FIXING THE SUPREME COURT NOMINATION 
PROCESS 170–78 (2005) (proposing a constitutional amendment to provide for for the election of 
Supreme Court Justices); CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER, THE NEXT JUSTICE: REPAIRING THE SUPREME 
COURT’S APPOINTMENT PROCESS 187 (2007) (urging Senators to confirm only “moderate” nominees to 
the Court and to focus their questions on uncovering extremism); Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, If the Judi-
cial Confirmation Process is Broken, Can a Statute Fix It?, 85 NEB. L. REV. 960 (2007) (proposing a 
series of possible statutory reforms to regulate the processes of judicial selection and confirmation); 
Stephen Choi & Mitu Gulati, A Tournament of Judges?, 92 CAL. L. REV. 299 (2004) (proposing the 
selection of Supreme Court Justices based upon a competition among appellate judges with the winner 
selected by objective criteria such as opinion publication rates and the number of citations by other 
judges and academics); Richard D. Manoloff, The Advice and Consent of the Congress: Toward a 
Supreme Court Appointment Process for Our Time, 54 OHIO ST. L.J. 1087, 1105 (1993) (proposing a 
role for the House of Representatives in the appointments process).
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the Court;227 and even “eliminat[ing] the position of Supreme Court Jus-
tice”228 altogether— Congress’s thinking is small.
Absent, too, in the modern Congress is any real sense that the Su-
preme Court can be brought to heel: say, by constitutional amendment, by 
stripping the Court of funding, by hauling in members of the Court to justi-
fy their rulings before congressional investigatory committees, by appoint-
ing special counsels to review and report back on what the Court does, by 
impeaching the Justices (or locking them up), or by simply ignoring or 
defying judicial rulings. Perhaps the Court does not rule in ways that offend 
enough members of Congress (or their constituents) for them to invest the 
energy—and political capital—required to generate these sorts of measures. 
Perhaps, instead, members of Congress do not consider such measures 
appropriate in our constitutional system. In either case, modesty on the part 
of Congress is the result, even in an era when a single party controls both
the Congress and the White House. The lesson for the Court is that so long 
as it continues doing—more or less—what is has done in recent years, it 
has very little to fear from the Congress.
CONCLUSION
After President Trump nominated Neil Gorsuch to fill the vacancy on 
the Supreme Court left by the death of Justice Scalia, fifteen House Repub-
licans sponsored a Resolution that “the House firmly supports the nomina-
tion of Neil Gorsuch to the Supreme Court” and “the Senate should hold a 
swift confirmation of this nomination.”229 The proposed resolution died, 
without further action, in the Committee on the Judiciary. While Gorsuch 
was, of course, confirmed, the failure of the Republican-controlled House 
to pass a simple resolution supporting the nomination is telling. After an 
election season in which the Supreme Court figured very prominently, 
aside from the Senate’s confirmation of a new Justice, Congress in 2017 
accomplished nothing with respect to the Supreme Court. Various bills and 
resolutions—some sponsored by Republicans, others by Democrats, and 
some garnering bipartisan support—targeted statutory and constitutional 
rulings by the Court and sought also to impose new regulations upon the 
Court’s activities. Even the most modest of these proposals failed to ad-
vance through the legislative process and become law. We like to think that 
the Supreme Court, guided solely by the rule of law, is above politics. The 
227. See generally MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS
(1999).
228. John O. McGinnis, Justice Without Justices, 16 CONST. COMMENT. 541, 541 (1999).
229. H.R. Res. 181, 115th Cong. (2017).
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experience of 2017 suggests that the Court may also be above politics in 
the quite different sense that its rulings and activities are largely immune to 
political response and redress.
